Abstract
Peacocke spells out a distinction between two kinds of explanation in terms of whether a given explanation appeals to interactions among representational vehicles (“Type 1” explanation), or instead to operations on representational contents (“Type 2” explanation). He suggests that, in many cases, empirical evidence favors a Type 1 explanation over a Type 2 explanation. The evidence in question, in several of these examples, is evidence that a cognitive task is achieved via operations on magnitudes. But such evidence does not itself point to a vehicle-explanation over a content-explanation: an explanation that appeals to operations on represented magnitudes fits the empirical evidence just as well. What, then, justifies the move from the empirically-supported claim—that the cases Peacocke cites should be given magnitude-explanations—to the conclusion that he seems to draw—the distinct claim that these cases should be given vehicle-explanations? I consider some possible answers and suggest that, in at least one of Peacocke’s examples (mental scanning/rotation tasks), the move from magnitude-explanation to vehicle-explanation is ill-motivated.