Abstract
This chapter examines the empirical self insofar as it is involved in moral conflict, deliberation, and action. To begin, it outlines the faculties of feeling and desire that constitute a large part of what Kant characterizes as the empirical self, paying special attention to the precise ways in which feeling and desire might pose a threat to morality. Despite these dangers, Kant’s suggestion is not that we should extirpate sensibility altogether. Indeed, the faculty of feeling, in particular, is fundamentally bound up with our moral capacity and our moral experience. The chapter goes on to explore various ‘aesthetic preconditions’ related to feeling that must already be in place in order for an agent to be bound or obligated by morality. Crucially, however, this is not a claim that the moral law itself is somehow secretly grounded in feeling. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the proper place of the empirical self in Kant’s moral theory, including the attitudes that we ought to take toward the empirical self, and how this might ultimately inform our interpretation of moral action and moral choice.