Abstract
Quantifier variance is a prominent approach to contemporary metaontology that is noted for leading to a deflationary view of ontological debates. Here we explain the metasemantics of quantifier variance and distinguish between modest and strong forms of variance (Section 1), explain some key applications (Section 2), clear up some misunderstandings and address objections (Section 3), and point the way toward future directions of quantifier-variance-related research (Section 4).
Modest variance says that there are many distinct quantifier languages–quantifier languages where translating one language’s quantifier into the other’s results in massive failures of charity. The anti-ontological arguments associated with quantifier variance rely on a stronger form, one that builds upon modest variance. Strong variantists endorse an egalitarian version of the pluralism about quantifier languages endorsed by modest variantists. Strong quantifier variance applies to quantifier languages the general thought that truth-conditionally equivalent languages are equally good, metaphysically speaking. Strong quantifier variance takes the quantifier language pluralism of modest variance and adds to it an account of the metaphysical merit of languages in terms of their truth-conditional equivalence. According to modest quantifier variance, this is false –there is a quantifier language in which the material object claims made by English speakers come out true. Naturally enough, the original applications of quantifier variance were aimed at demystifying the ontological disputes engaged in by philosophers.