Abstract
This chapter introduces the concept of I-blindness, defined as the inability to form first-person thoughts, and distinguishes it from Shoemaker’s notion of self-blindness, where individuals fail to recognize their own mental states. It explores how I-blindness undermines rational agency, since de se belief—beliefs expressed through “I”—are necessary for intentions, plans, and actions at a normal human level. The chapter develops Perry’s “essential indexical” example, showing that de se knowledge uniquely grounds rational behavior, while the “magic bullet” section emphasizes the indispensability of the Kaplan-Perry rule governing the use of “I.” It also analyzes epistemic problems faced by an I-blind subject, including difficulties with indexicals, demonstratives, and the absence of awareness of mental states, which prevent the subject from forming coherent knowledge of the world and mind–body relations. Finally, the chapter considers the relation between de se attitudes and language, arguing that genuine de se thought requires linguistic structures governed by the first-person rule, in contrast to the metaphorical attributions made to non-linguistic creatures.