Abstract
This paper will examine what is missing in various sections of Division Two in Heidegger’s Being and Time; in particular, we must reexamine section 65 on ‘ecstatic temporality’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 377), section 69 on the ‘whither’ of each ecstasis as a ‘horizonal schema’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 416), and section 72 on the distinction of ‘ontological movement’ and ‘ontic motion’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 427). We will argue that Heidegger’s very brief attempts to deal with Kant’s ‘schematism’ (Kant, 1998, p. 271) in his 1927 lecture, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and the 1929 book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, leads to a foreclosure for Heidegger himself to return to Being and Time on its most difficult problem: the elucidation of ‘time itself as the horizon for Being’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 488). For this expansion could have been a publishable version of its Division Three within Being and Time itself. Instead of imagining a Division Three that could come after Being and Time, for example, the 1927 Basic Problems of Phenomenology, one can try to inscribe a Division Three within the existing Division Two of Being and Time.
By reopening Kant’s brief section on the schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason (1998) and re-occupying sections 65, 69, and 72 of Division Two of Being and Time, we will attempt to do what Heidegger himself could not accomplish in his work after Being and Time. This abides by the maxim Heidegger himself states about Kant in his 1927 lecture: ‘thus our intention and task, in properly understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, necessarily includes the claim to understand Kant better than he understood himself’ (Heidegger, 1997, p. 2).
Our aim in this paper is to understand Heidegger better than he understood himself, particularly after Being and Time. Time - in its primordial derivation of our common intuition of a linear, flow, of passing (arising and coming to be) of now-points - can be construed as a complex temporalizing-interrelations-movements-event that neither Kant nor Heidegger could flesh out. The significance of this undertaking would make it irreducible to current debates; or scholarship about the ‘failure’ of fundamental ontology in Being and Time and thereafter, which leads to the so-called Kehre or ‘turning’ that marks the ‘later’ Heidegger period (Braver, 2015). Rather, to complete Being and Time within Being and Time would require a suspension of Heidegger’s thought altogether, all that is offered in the published Gesamtausgabe.