Abstract
This dissertation examines how target states respond to territorial faits accomplis, defined as limited land grabs designed to minimize risks of escalation. Specifically, it attempts to answer two key questions. First, why do target states of fait accompli sometimes refrain from immediate actions to reverse their territorial losses? Second, why do most attempts at reversing faits accomplis succeed? While some existing studies have explained why states may decide to launch a fait accompli, no published work to date has theorized and analyzed the target states’ response. This dissertation therefore fills an important gap in the literature.
My dataset shows that in roughly one-third of the cases, targets of fait accompli choose restraint rather than seek to immediately reverse the territorial loss. By studying four different cases ranging from the South China Sea to the Falklands, I find that targets of faits accomplis tend to show restraint only when the lost territory is not vital and when restraint is expected to produce a greater settlement or help manage a more pressing security threat. Regarding the efficacy of responses, I argue that it chiefly depends on whether the initiator miscalculates or not. Efforts to reverse faits accomplis tend to succeed when initiators realize that they underestimated the target’s resolve and overestimated international support for its cause. Because initiators expect a cheap conquest, they tend to surrender when it turns out to be much costlier than expected.