Abstract
This dissertation, Reconceptualizing Security: Clientelism and the Provision of Order in Lebanon, seeks to understand the logic of public goods provision by clientelistic political parties, or political parties that offer the conditional exchange of material goods or resources to voters for political support. It asks what explains the variation in the provision of security and local policing by political parties? Empirically, this project studies the variation in security provision across political parties in Lebanon in five different locales. The project thus aims to explain why certain parties defer to the state for security as opposed to providing their own security measures.
Security is the canonical public good provided by the state to its citizens. Yet, many states, especially those in the late developing world, are incapable or unwilling to provide citizens with security. The provision of security, order, and management of crime is a crucial “good” that parties can and do offer their constituents, particularly in divided and insecure societies. Studying the politicization of security provision is crucial given its effects on the daily, lived experiences of citizens, as well as the effects it may have on the ability of the state to develop and maintain its role as protector.
The central assertion is that whether political parties will step into the role of security provider and what type of security they provide is based on 1. their commitment to the state and 2. their organizational structure. I conceptualize two distinct types of policing and security by political parties with distinct political logics: community-oriented policing and border management. Community-oriented policing involves actions that seek to keep peace and status quo within a specific locale. This may include organizing neighborhood watches or resolving disputes between neighbors. This form of policing is a service provided to citizens that may operate on a quid pro quo basis; it is targeted towards voters and supporters on the condition that they support the political party. Border management, by comparison, intends to secure the boundaries of a given area through measures like erecting barricades or manning checkpoints. Political parties use institutionalized security to establish their authority and claim credit for providing protection for their constituents. These measures may also serve to constrain the state, protecting the party’s activities and resources from state encroachment. They indicate the party’s strength and control over territory, and prevent the state from actualizing its monopolistic authority. Unlike ad hoc policing, institutionalized policing is unlikely to be distributed on a quid pro quo basis because it is targeted at the community level like a constituency service and thus non-excludable.
First, I claim that some political parties prioritize their role as elected state representatives and are dedicated to the creation and maintenance of a true Weberian State. They are unlikely to operate as policemen, as doing so undermines state authority. They thus lack a willingness to politicize security because of its clear infringement upon the authority of the state. Conversely, other parties prioritize their private interests, such as the needs of their constituents or their long-term goals, over their commitment to the state. These parties are willing to implement any and all types of security, as they have little regard for the potential deleterious effects it may have on the state. These two types of parties represent ideal types. In reality, political parties exist along a spectrum and balance these interests.
Second, I claim that political parties need a strong organizational structure to have the capacity to provide security. I define a strong organizational structure as having both a cohesive political party and deep social embeddedness. In essence, political parties need to have strong linkages among their members and with the local community they serve in order to properly coordinate and manage security mechanisms. This is because security provision requires three things: 1. The ability to manage and direct resources, 2. The ability to organize and direct people, including preventing members from defecting and personalizing services in their own name, and 3. The cooperation of the local population. Parties with moderate or weak connections with their local representatives and members are less capable of organizing and scheduling the various activities required for effective policing, and are also less capable at deterring potential defectors from personalizing any services. Similarly, parties need to have the support of local communities in order to avoid protests or insurrection at this type of non-state governance.