Abstract
This thesis examines the evolution of the American naval-industrial complex through a case study of General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), from the late nineteenth century through the Cold War and into the post-Keynesian era. I argue that the naval-industrial complex is best understood through analyzing the transitions between three military economic models–laissez-faire capitalism, Military Keynesianism, and post-Keynesian reform–as the transitions between these models reveal the differences in the prioritization of three facets of the naval-industrial-governmental relationship: private profits, government expenditure, and national security. Early free-market arms production encouraged innovation but undermined national security, prompting the rise of Military Keynesianism, which aligned private industry with national security priorities and enabled mid-twentieth-century expansion through massive government expenditure. The subsequent shift toward privatization and austerity, sparked by civilian disillusion with the Military-Keynesian model and its impact on the wider economy, destabilized this system, producing a monopolistic-monopsonistic relationship between the Navy and contractors like GDEB. This dependency reduced the accountability of the Navy’s private partners, exemplified by the conflict over the Los Angeles-class submarine construction and Admiral Hyman Rickover’s resignation. Ultimately, the thesis argues that enduring structural tensions between profit and security drive the failures of the naval-industrial complex.