Abstract
This analysis develops criteria to assess current Multilateral, or multinational, nuclear fuel arrangements (MFAs). MFAs have been proposed to assure the supply of nuclear fuel while upholding the goals of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The proposals on the table are designed to ensure the consistent supply of nuclear fuel to recipient states and increase security of sensitive material and technologies that could be diverted to weapons programs. At the urging of former Director General Mohamed ElBaradei the international community began formulating proposals for MFAs in the early-mid 2000s. The proposals aimed to standardize fuel supply criteria and provide recipient states with supply assurances against political disruptions. The proposals were designed by supplier states, and therefore were not complete in their analysis of recipient state needs and motivations. This analysis will provide an overview of the nonproliferation regime and fuel-cycle technologies to gain a better understanding of supplier and recipient state concerns when approaching MFAs. It will then suggest criteria against which MFA proposals can be assessed. I have found that proposals \r requiring extra-legal commitments for supply, like giving up the right to enrich uranium domestically or requiring adherence to the voluntary Additional Protocol, have not been considered acceptable by many states. I argue that MFAs are paramount in upholding the rights of states under the NPT while aiding in efforts to increase global security.