Logo image
Home Academic units
Sign in
Excessive financing costs in a representative agent framework
Journal article

Excessive financing costs in a representative agent framework

Maya Eden
American economic journal, Vol.8(2), pp.215-237
2016

Abstract

This paper highlights a pecuniary externality that results in excessive financing costs. Firms borrow to finance purchases of an inelastically supplied input, bidding up its price. Since higher input prices necessitate more debt obligations, this leads to an increase in intermediation costs. A quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that it is optimal to tax financial intermediation by increasing the borrowing rate by 3 percentage points. (JEL E13, E44, G21, G32, H21, H25)

UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

This output has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:

#8 Decent Work and Economic Growth

Metrics

5 Record Views

Details