Abstract
It is clear to any observer of the Islamic Republic that the system (or nizam, as it is known in Iran), the political elite and the population learn lessons from each election and apply them to the next one---from the how and why of "election engineering" (various forms of fixing or tampering with the vote) to the building of coalitions among former enemies to impassioned arguments among citizens about whether to vote. These lessons are distinct each time. But somehow Western analysis of Iranian elections falls into the same familiar pattern: In the weeks leading up to the balloting, analysts alternately pronounce the results predictable and fixate on whomever is the perceived favorite of the Leader. Or, since 2009, Western commentators assume that the election is rigged. Or, when it becomes clear that none of these readings will suffice, headlines such as "Iranian Presidential Election Will Render a Weaker Regime" (Forbes) and "Iran's Illusionary Presidential Election" (US News & World Report) begin to appear. The names of the players change, but the frameworks of analysis and the underlying assumptions remain the same. Here are four of the most commonly recurring assumptions.