Abstract
This article is Part One of a two-article series. This first article introduces a twofold hypothesis regarding the incompletion of Division Two of Heidegger’s Being and Time and the possibility of constructing anew its missing Division Three. This crucial section, which never came to light, is mentioned in the outline at the end of the Introduction with the title- “time and Being” (Heidegger 1962, 64; Braver, 2015). The focus will be a close reading of section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two. The first part of the hypothesis is that a four-dimensional temporalization is buried beneath Heidegger’s articulations of the ‘equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 377-380), which derives both the ‘endless, infinite time of arising and passing away’ of now points in and as ongoing linear time (Heidegger 1962, 379); and that this linear time consists of past (no longer now), present (now), and future (yet to be now), in which the ‘ready-to-hand arises and passes away’ (Heidegger 1962, 379). This ‘inauthentic, infinite, endless time’ (Heidegger 1962, 379) is nothing other than past, present, future and their interrelations in our subjective intuitions and apperceptive range, or measurement of external realities via seasons, clocks, and calendars. Change and movement are given as natural realities without question. However, this common sense understanding is not Heidegger’s ‘primordial finite, authentic temporalizing of temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 379), first introduced in section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two. The second part of the hypothesis asserts that in order to excavate this four-dimensional temporalization, we must undo Heidegger’s treatment of Plato and Aristotle, particularly in section 81, which is the penultimate chapter before he confronts Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in section 82. Part Two, which is the second article in this series, will consider anew the complex aporias and limits of the relationship between time, movement, change, and being in Plato and Aristotle within Being and Time while bracketing Heidegger’s incessant need to read Kant while distancing himself from Kant by lumping him within the basic ontology of time and being (Heidegger 1962, 45) that descends from Plato and Aristotle. We argue that this is all necessary in order to frame a comprehensive analysis of how Heidegger treats Hegel at the end of Being and Time; in that fateful encounter the chance for completing Being and Time was suspended, a suspension that does not have to remain indefinite.The two article-series argues that the completion of Being and Time transcends debates about the continuity or discontinuity of Heidegger’s Being and Time with the ‘later’ Heidegger (Thomson as cited in Braver, 2015).