Abstract
Saudi participation serves US interests in two important ways. First, Saudi Arabia will be perceived by Iraqi Sunnis as their representative and protector in the negotiations, and they consequently will feel less defensive. This could help reduce the intensity of the Sunni insurgency. The decline in the Sunni insurgency will in turn reduce the [Shi]'ite violence, which is often a response to Sunni attacks. Iran wants Sunni countries to accept the Shi'ite-dominated government of Iraq and to help end the Sunni insurgency against it. But this is unlikely unless the mainstream Sunni governments are actively involved in negotiations over the security of Iraq and the rights of its Sunni minority. Participation of Saudi Arabia in these talks can be a positive step in the direction of Sunni involvement. Furthermore, Iran is facing rising anti-Shi'ite sentiments in the Arab world. These sentiments are inflamed by Wahabi religious leaders in Saudi Arabia and, to some extent, they are tolerated by Saudi government. Saudi participation in the security talks would provide an opening for Iran to improve its ties with Saudi leaders and put a damper on anti-Shi'ite sentiments.