Abstract
Why is that when a loved one dies, grief seems inescapable and then diminishes? The brilliant Edinburgh philosopher Berislav Marusic's "Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief" begins with his grief for the unexpected and early loss of his mother: "I stopped grieving or at least the grief diminished, yet the reason didn't really change. It's not like that my mother stopped mattering to me or that I stopped loving her, but still this change in grief somehow seemed reasonable." What are philosophers and the rest of us to make of this durable insight? John is lucky to be joined in this discussion of Beri's thoughts on grief by his new Brandeis philosophy colleague, Katie Elliott. She is not afraid to complicate things further, proposing to Beri that we distinguish between the immediate affective intensity of the initial loss and persistent negative emotions towards the fact of the loss, even when that initial affective heat of loss has faded. Beri responds that emotions are "thinking with feeling" and we maybe want to be skeptical about splitting the two. Beri sees two aspects of grief: "On the one hand, the vision of loss that is constituted by grief and on the other hand, a vision of grief from a empirical or as some philosophers, like to say, a creature construction perspective." It is wrong to make a pragmatist case for the sheerly functional advantages of getting over grief, and also a mistake to see (like Sigmund Freud) grief as a kind of work, a task, to detach oneself from the mourned object. John asks what it means that he personalizes his sensation of grief, focusing not on the lost beloved, but on the way the beloved, or the lost beloved, remains present to him, a loss felt inside himself. Beri invokes Iris Murdoch's warning against the "fat relentless ego" (The Sovereignty of Good, 1970, p 50) intruding itself-when what really should be at stake is the lost object of one's grief. Beri closes by suggesting that grief doesn't happen to us in the way digestion happens (purely involuntary). Sure, grief is not strictly controllable, and yet because it is reasons responsive rather than simply somatic, it is me.