Abstract
The Underwood Tariff of 1913, an initiative of newly elected Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, sought to lower cumulative tariff rates from 20.0% to 8.8%. This fiercely contested bill passed by a margin of 320-195. The question posed by this paper is, Why did congressmen vote for or against the Underwood Tariff? While party affiliation plays a large role, with Democrats favoring passage and Republicans opposing, it is believed that the economic characteristics of a congressman’s state are the primary catalysts in determining voting. This paper tests for three economic models: the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, an adaptation of the Ricardo-Viner trade model, and a model that proxies for the effect of income taxes. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, which accounts for relative factor endowments, is proven to be the only statistically significant model. Using the Heckscher-Ohlin variable, a Capital to Land ratio for each state, this paper proves that congressmen from states that have agrarian economies support freer trade and congressmen from states that have manufacturing economies support protectionism.