From Corruption to Combat: The Militarization of Organized Crime in Mexico

This thesis examines how Mexico’s federal anti-organized crime strategies contributed to the militarization of major criminal organizations, specifically the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel. It argues that the state's adoption of high-value targeting (HVT) and counterinsurgency based interdiction (CBI) reshaped the structure, leadership, and behavior of organized crime groups (OCGs). Through comparative case studies the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel, the research demonstrates that differing responses to federal pressure produced divergent organizational models: Jalisco adopted overt militarization and territorial control, while Sinaloa relied on fragmented leadership and political corruption to minimize confrontation. Drawing on primary sources, academic literature, and open-source intelligence, the study shows that militarization was not merely a state-driven process but also an adaptive strategy by OCGs to survive and expand in a more hostile environment. These findings highlight the unintended consequences of militarized security policies and contribute to broader discussions on organized crime, state violence, and security governance in Mexico.