Abstract
Israel is currently the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear weapons. Although the exact details of Israel’s nuclear program are shrouded in secrecy, most states accept that Israel has them. Despite this, Israel has never confirmed their existence, nor made any kind of effort to integrate them into regular military doctrine. This strategy has been coined, ‘strategic ambiguity.' By examining current academic research on nuclear strategy, it is possible to see that this situation is unlikely to remain unchanged if Iran goes nuclear. In fact, it is almost certain that Iranian 'nuclearization' will precipitate major changes in Israeli nuclear strategy. This Honors Thesis examines the history and underlying reasons for the promulgation of Israel's doctrine of strategic ambiguity. It then follows with an analysis of Iranian security needs and concerns, as well as an analysis of deterrence theory and the relevant applications to the Middle East regional system. Although it is impossible to predict the future, thorough research into writings on Israel, Iran, the Middle East's inter-state rivals, deterrence theory, nonproliferation, and nuclear strategy and policy allow for an enlightened examination of how Israel's nuclear doctrine specifically, and this region of the world generally, may change if Iran obtains nuclear weapons.