Abstract
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant argues that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. This paper argues that this claim is valuable as a conceptual connection between aesthetics and morality due to its ability to account for our intuitions while also not falling into the various conceptual issues into which other ways of connecting the two subjects fall. In the first chapter, the paper argues that four central characteristics of beauty which Kant argues for can be grounded with minimal relation to Kant's overall system. In the second chapter, the paper expands upon the sparse discussion Kant gives of symbolism, for the neglected purpose of having a clearer sense of the original claim Kant makes. In the course of this chapter, the largely undetermined Kantian category of 'ideas of reason' is retooled with respect to the possibility of having notions that require a sense of agency in others and an aside on aesthetic ideas and their connection to art and symbolism is considered. In the third chapter, the paper gives a brief exploration of certain core characteristics of morality before arguing first that the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good and second that the beautiful is (in a strong sense) the primary symbol of the morally good. In the course of this argument, the paper considers the possibility of the sublime (as posited by Paul Guyer) and aesthetic ideas being alternative symbols of the morally good, but finds that each has a different relationship to the morally good. The third chapter ends with some thoughts about the implications of the beautiful being the symbol of the morally good for moral education, and these considerations carry over into the conclusion. The paper concludes with some comparisons between the proposed symbolic relationship between beauty and morality and other possible ways of connecting the two, as well as a final discussion about the value of a sense of the beautiful for our moral lives.
Also included are two appendices. The first discusses beauty with an eye towards Kant's systematic philosophy, while the second considers a possible radical implication of the paper's newly refined notion of ideas of reason and a certain quality of beauty --- subjective universality --- for the foundations of Kant's moral theory.