Abstract
This thesis approaches Russian foreign energy policy in the post-Soviet space between 2000 and 2011 as an attempt to secure stable long-term export revenues. Drawing from the literature on relational contracting, this paper conceptualizes energy diplomacy as the construction and revision of informal bilateral contracts between states over the control and use rights of specific assets. Such an approach allows a cleaner analysis of Russian goals and tactics by focusing on variation in energy-specific capabilities and interests. By analyzing bilateral hold-up situations between Russia and its neighbors, as well as institutional arrangements influencing state-market relations, this paper develops a model for energy-related conflict and cooperation. Process-tracing the case studies of Russian relations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Lithuania reveals the importance of time horizons for relative hold-up advantage and credible commitments accommodating in navigating disputes over energy infrastructure control and use. Panel regression analysis of Gazprom natural gas export prices confirms these causal relationships, showing the independent effects of hold-up position, economic liberalization, and regional integration on price negotiations. In demonstrating the importance of these structural and institutional variables, this research offers a new analytical framework for understanding conflict and cooperation surrounding international energy transit.