Abstract
Economic conditions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including several financial crises and the Great Depression, prompted the United States government to consider varying policy approaches. Keynesian economics, which promoted government regulation and spending, rose to power during the 1930s with the New Deal and remained prominent until the early 1970s, when inflation and distrust of liberal policy prompted a shift toward monetarism, favoring market deregulation. The change laid the groundwork for the rise under President Ronald Reagan of neoliberalism, a political-economic philosophy that promoted free markets and enhanced corporate power through deregulation and the privatization of some government functions. This thesis argues that throughout these dramatic shifts in ideology and government policy, the United States Supreme Court's rulings closely paralleled the sentiment and rhetoric underlying the prevalent economic models of the day. In a close analysis of Supreme Court opinions—concerning government regulation of securities markets—the thesis shows that the Court’s decisions reflected a posture of judicial activism in support of the political-economic ideology favored at the time, instead of in any cohesive jurisprudence or mode of constitutional interpretation. Analysis of the extent to which economic externalities affect the Supreme Court's securities decisions demonstrates the influence of academic movements when paired with public and political support and provides a lens through which to understand the Court’s contemporary securities decisions.