Abstract
This thesis seeks to identify why states would gain authorization from international organizations (IOs) when going to war. While IO processes to authorize or deny the use of force, such as the UN Security Council, have long been presented as ways to work towards a more peaceful world, states rarely take advantage of them. Using declassified materials made available through presidential libraries, I have analyzed the diplomatic strategy of the U.S. in the lead-up to two key conflicts where it gained IO authorization of the use of force: the Gulf War in 1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999. I have found that the decision to seek IO authorization can be explained by the coercing state’s desire to signal resolve to the target state, in the hope that it takes threats seriously and stands down, and the pressure on the coercing state from key allies to follow a diplomatic process instead of rushing to war. This contrasts with motivations identified by the existing literature, which tends to solely emphasize either instrumental or normative explanations for state action. By combining elements of both groups of theories and identifying key caveats in my own argument, I create an account of motivations for seeking IO authorization of the use of force that can more accurately explain state behavior in a much larger group of cases.