Nader Habibi

Kurds constitute a viable ethnic group with historic roots and presence in four Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. The relations between the central governments of these countries and their minorities have often been contentious and occasionally violent. I propose two policy measures for these four countries in this paper to implement regarding their respective Kurdish minorities. First, while remaining fully committed to the prevention of separatism, they should enhance the cultural and political rights of the minorities and reduce the development gap of the predominantly Kurdish regions relative to the national average. Currently, this gap is visible in all countries other than Iraq. Second, the initiative to enhance minority rights and improve their economic conditions can be better realized if these countries coordinate their policy reforms in the framework of a regional agreement. The article argues that without coordination each country will be worried that if it gives more political and social rights to its Kurdish minority, these rights might be exploited by neighbors to provoke ethnic insurgency and separatist tendencies. A coordination among these countries for harmonization of their policies toward the Kurds, will overcome this concern and will increase the likelihood that all four countries will increase the rights and opportunities that they offer to Kurds.

This study examines the impact of international economic sanctions, imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program, on the development of its middle class. Specifically, it investigates how Iran's middle class would have evolved absent sanctions post-2012. Using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) with nested optimization, we construct a counterfactual scenario for Iran based on a weighted average of comparable countries that mirror pre-2012 Iran but without significant sanctions. Our SCM results indicate that sanctions led to an average annual reduction of 17 percentage points in the size of Iran's middle class from 2012 to 2019. Our Synthetic Difference-in-Differences (SDID) analysis, however, provides a more conservative estimate of a 12 percentage points average annual loss, reinforcing the robustness of the findings. These estimates capture the total effect of sanctions, encompassing both their direct economic shocks, and Iran's policy responses. These results are validated through extensive sensitivity checks, including in-space and in-time placebo tests, leave-one-out analyses, and bias-corrected SCM. We also identify real GDP per capita, merchandise imports and exports, investment, industry value added, informal and vulnerable employment as key channels through which sanctions negatively impact the middle class. •Sanctions significantly contracted Iran's middle class.•The study uses counterfactual analysis to isolate the causal effect of sanctions.•It applies Synthetic Difference-in-Differences for robustness.•It traces the economic pathways of sanctions' impact on Iran's middle class.

The political system of most predominantly Muslim countries is either authoritarian or semi-democratic. The common understanding of the Islamic texts on politics is that Islam calls obedience toward the rulers, which implies that it is compatible with the authoritarian mode of governance. In this article I argue that a careful examination of Quranic text and the Hadith (behavior and decisions of prophet Mohammad) demand that a Muslim society be governed as a democratic system. Citizens (believers) must obey the ruler, but the legitimacy of the ruler can only be assured by majority support in political elections. I also argue that the rights and protections that have been granted to the people of the Book (Christian and Jews) imply that an Islamic society must guarantee freedom of lifestyle and belief for all citizens even when those behaviors and beliefs are considered sinful in Islam. Finally, the article argues that democracy will be beneficial for empowerment and economic prosperity of Muslim nations.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Central Asian republics are strengthening economic and diplomatic ties, evidenced by increased bilateral relations, ministerial gatherings, and a 2023 GCC-C5 summit with a follow-up planned for 2025. Despite currently low trade volumes, both regions aim to expand trade and investment, particularly as they diversify their economies. A key challenge is transportation, with three potential land routes: the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) via Iran, the Development Road Project (DRP) through Iraq and Turkey, and the Trans-Afghan Corridor. While the NSTC via Iran is currently operational and the most cost-effective, US sanctions pose a challenge. The DRP and Trans-Afghan Corridor offer alternatives but face their own hurdles, including geopolitical issues, security concerns, and funding needs. This transit corridor competition is expected to improve connectivity options between the GCC and Central Asia, mitigating risks associated with reliance on a single route.

After the second World War, the Middle East has experienced more conflict and war than any other region in the world. In this essay I ask whether the three dominant tribes that make up the Middle East -Arabs, Turks, and Iranians- have the capacity to reduce their tensions and
move toward regional cooperation. These tensions and conflicts have deep historical and cultural roots that need to be addressed. Furthermore, Arabs, Turks and Iranians can learn from the experience of other regions of the world such as Europe and South America, which have managed to overcome conflict and develop strong regional bonds. I argue that the first step in this direction is to transition from the current state of cold war and proxy wars to cold peace, which can be followed by a warm peace. As a practical first step I recommend the creation of regionalist advocacy groups in Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries.