Graham W Wright

Ensuring that Jewish educational initiatives address the growing diversity of the US Jewish community requires, in part, understanding the background characteristics of participants and how a given educational program affects the trajectory of Jewish engagement for those with little, moderate, or a substantial amount of prior Jewish education and experiences. The present paper undertakes this analysis using the example of Birthright Israel. First, using latent class analysis, we develop a data-informed typology for classifying different religious and cultural childhood experiences of American Jewish young adults. We then examine the extent to which each group in the typology is impacted by participation in Birthright Israel, using an analytic approach that compares pre- and post-trip responses for both individuals who participated in Birthright Israel and a comparison group of those who applied but did not participate. We find that for some measures, Birthright Israel has a significant impact on participants with a variety of background experiences, while for other outcomes, Birthright Israel’s impact is concentrated among those with the least exposure to Jewish life.

Since October 7, 2023, antisemitism on American campuses hasbecome a contested political issue. Scholars of antisemitism arguethat the relationship between antisemitism and political ideologyfollows a “horseshoe” pattern, with higher levels of antisemitichostility on both the far right and far left. However, existing empiricalresearch has yet to establish this connection, in part becauseantisemitism may be expressed differently on opposite sides of theleft-right political spectrum. To address this challenge, we develop ameasure of antisemitism grounded in both formal definitions andempirical data about how US Jewish college students perceive anti-Jewish and anti-Israel statements and then measure the prevalenceof these attitudes among non-Jewish US college undergraduates. Wefind that explicit anti-Jewish attitudes are more common amongthose with far-right political identities, and beliefs about Israel thatformal definitions and most Jewish students find antisemitic aremore common among those who identify with the political left.

In the 2023–2024 academic year reports of antisemitism on U.S.

college campuses surged. At the same time, contentious

debates about what antisemitism means reignited, in particular,

with respect to criticism of Israel. The present study addresses

this debate through a bottom-up approach that centers on the

perspective of the targets of antisemitism. Surveys conducted

during the 2023–2024 academic year with Jewish students on

over 50 campuses reveal wide agreement that certain statements

about Israel are inherently antisemitic and that these

views remained stable over the academic year.

Notwithstanding the increasing alignment between social and political identities, political divisions exist within social groups as well as between them. Despite their shared traditions, American Jews face similar political divisions as Americans in general. But could the perception of a common threat, such as antisemitism, alter the dynamics of political polarization within a social group? American Jews' concerns about antisemitism might themselves be filtered through political identities, with liberal Jews more concerned about "traditional" antisemitism (long-standing anti-Jewish stereotypes) emanating from the political right, and conservative Jews concerned about "Israel-related" antisemitism (blaming individual Jews for the actions of Israel) associated with the political left. Using a sample of over 2000 Jewish young adults, we find that, although liberal and conservative Jews are equally concerned about traditional antisemitism, conservatives are significantly more concerned about Israel-related antisemitism than liberals. We also find that, after a series of high-profile attacks on American Jews related to the 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict, liberal and conservative Jews' concerns about Israel-related antisemitism increased at similar rates. These results suggest that, although concerns about antisemitism are influenced by political identity, rising antisemitism is unlikely to exacerbate political polarization between liberal and conservative Jews.

Although there is substantial research on the effectiveness of online learning at the individual class level, there is little reliable data on how a shift to a mostly or fully virtual campus would impact undergraduates' satisfaction, engagement, and academic achievement. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, the limited adoption of widespread online learning at selective schools and challenges of selection bias hindered a reliable assessment of such a shift in selective institutions. After the initial period of " emergency remote learning " in 2020, many selective institutions continued widespread online learning in the second year of the pandemic. Treating the expanded deployment of online learning as a natural experiment, the present study assesses the impact of frequent online learning during the spring semester of 2021 on representative samples of undergraduate students at three selective, four-year universities. The study finds that students who participated in classes that met in person at least once a week had higher evaluations of faculty engagement and higher overall levels of academic satisfaction, compared to those who never or rarely participated in an in-person class. This relationship appears less pronounced for Black and Asian students than for White students but does not vary significantly by gender. Although online learning has great potential, these results suggest a need to better understand the conditions that will support an expansion of online learning that can maintain student satisfaction.

Analyses of operational ideology—the pattern of correlations between different political attitudes—in the American public generally assume “spatial” models of ideology. Using Latent Class Analysis, we relax many of these assumptions by treating operational ideology as a latent categorical variable and analyze the changing structure of American operational ideology between 2004 and 2020. We find that some Americans during this period held consistently liberal or conservative views and were well sorted into the “correct” political parties. For other Americans, however, we observe complex and shifting relationships between partisanship and economic, moral, and racial attitudes. We find that Racial Justice Communitarians consistently prefer to identify as Democrats, while Nativist Communitarians and Libertarians both tended to identify with whatever party won the most recent presidential election. Future studies of operational ideology should be wary of simplifying assumptions that obscure important dynamics in American politics.

The Pew Research Center’s 2020 survey of American Jews is a valuable resource to scholars of American Jewry, enabling interrogation of questions using data that no other source can reliably provide. One set of questions pertains to the reach and impact of Birthright Israel, the largest extant Jewish educational program targeted at Jewish young adults, on American Jews. Pew’s nationally representative sample provides important validation of previous findings regarding Birthright’s impact on participants and extends the generalizability of what has been learned. In this paper we use data from the 2020 Pew survey to assess the program’s “reach” into different segments of the American Jewish population and to extend the validity of existing findings regarding the program’s impact on participants’ attitudes and behaviors related to Israel and Jewish life. Pew’s data estimate that around 20% of American Jews ages 18–46 have participated in Birthright, and that among Jewish parents with a grown child, nearly 30% have an adult child who participated in the program. After controlling for preexisting differences between participants and those who have never been to Israel, Pew’s data also confirm that Birthright has a significant impact on a broad set of Jewish outcomes. These results support a more optimistic view of the future for US Jewry and suggest that the investment in large-scale educational interventions can substantially alter the trajectory of the American Jewish community writ large.

Emerging research suggests that people with disabilities experience an increased risk of sexual violence. However, few studies have examined the relationship between disability types and various forms of sexual violence, involving either physical or nonphysical force.
This cross-sectional study used nationally representative data from years 2011-2017 of the National Survey of Family Growth among women aged 18-44 years. Analyses were conducted in March 2020-June 2021. Using binary and multinomial logistic regression models, lifetime risk of sexual violence and experience of physical or nonphysical force at first intercourse were modeled as a function of disability type (sensory, physical, cognitive, or ≥2 disabilities). Models also controlled for relevant demographic confounders.
Women with any type of disability reported experiencing sexual violence in their lifetime approximately double the proportion of that experienced by nondisabled women (∼30% vs 16.9%), with women with multiple disabilities experiencing the greatest prevalence (42.1%) and risk (AOR=2.94, p<0.001) than nondisabled women. Women with cognitive disabilities or multiple disabilities were significantly more likely to experience either physical (cognitive: AOR=1.55, p<0.001; multiple: AOR=1.50, p<0.05) or nonphysical force (cognitive: AOR=2.28, p<0.01; multiple: AOR=2.74, p<0.001) during their first intercourse than nondisabled women.
Results of this study suggest that future research should focus on the association between various types of disability and sexual violence. The development of inclusive evidence-based violence intervention and prevention programs for girls and women with disabilities is recommended.

Deliberation’s effectiveness as a method of problem solving and democratic decision making is often seen as stemming from the persuasive power of the “forceless force” of argument to transform beliefs. However, because conflicts related to partisan polarization, conspiracy theories, and the COVID-19 pandemic often have deep connections to social identity, they may be difficult to resolve through a deliberative approach based on persuasion. Research shows that when the conclusions of an argument threaten participants’ social identities they are likely to engage in motivated reasoning, which inhibits the ability of any argument to induce belief change. In conflicts closely related to social identity a deliberative approach based around co-creation — such as Mary Parker Follett’s conception of integration — may be more productive than persuasion-based approaches. The contrast between these two approaches is illustrated in reference to contemporary conflicts between vaccine advocates and members of the “vaccine hesitancy and refusal” (VHR) community.

To what extent is it possible for American Jews to maintain a deep emotional connection to Israel while criticizing the actions of the Israeli government? This long-debated question echoes earlier investigations of different forms of patriotism toward one's home country. Drawing on two 2019 surveys of American Jews, we find that, like Americans in general, Jewish liberals and conservatives express different forms of patriotism toward both Israel and America. Jewish conservatives tend to oppose criticism of Israel and America for any reason, while Jewish liberals view criticism as an important part of “caring” about both countries. Both forms of patriotism are positively associated with stronger emotional connections to the relevant country. These results suggest that emotional connection to Israel represents a form of social identification with Israel and that lower levels of connection to Israel among some American Jews are driven more by apathy than active criticism or hostility.